






An Epic Vision of Christianity1 
 
OLIVIER ABEL 





In the late 1950s Paul Ricoeur wrote a programmatic essay on his vision of 
Christianity. Out of this essay could be gleaned an epic tone that has 
seemed to turn inaudible. This article seeks to make such epic tone audible. 
First, it situates the context out of which the epic strand in Ricoeur’s 
“theology” has emerged and asks why he would even dare to speak of 
theology as epic. Second, the article dwells on the kind of reader, author, 
and character the epic genre generates and asks who is capable, not only of 
reading and heeding the epic, but also of acting and working in an epic 
way. The final section surfaces the meaning and the limits of the epic. 




1 This text for the conference in Manila is a restatement, with modifications concerning some 
important points, of a paper presented during a Ricœur conference at the University of Strasbourg 
in 2013 and which appeared in the proceedings of the conference edited by Daniel Frey, La jeunesse 
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he following remarks aim to make audible the epic tone of the 
“young” Ricoeur, speaking of his vision of Christianity in a text 
at the end of the 1950s, “The Image of God and the Epic of Man,” 
which appeared in the Protestant and Socialist journal Christianisme 
social in 1960 and reprinted in the second edition of History and Truth. 
What one hears from this text is a confessing word (rather than a 
believing or confessional one), and one hears from there a tone which 
then seems to become inaudible, and, even for Ricoeur himself, 
impossible. Here is an excerpt which gives an example of the tone of 
that Ricoeur. 
Such is the panoramic fresco that I wished to place 
before you in order to give tone, measure, and 
proportion to our reflection. It opens us neither to an 
active pessimism nor to a tragic optimism—which in  
the last analysis is the same thing—but rather to an epical 
sense of our personal existence situated again within the 
perspective of a vaster epic of mankind and creation.2 
This text is the last in a series under the heading “Theological 
Perspectives.” It could be said that what we have here is his “little 
theology,” in the same way that we have in Oneself as Another his “little 
ethics.” I would first like to sketch in broad strokes the place of the 
epic in this “theology” and ask why Ricoeur dares to speak here of 
theology as epic. I would then, in a second part, like to ask what the 
subject of the epic is, that is to say, what kind of reader, author, and 
character is generated by the epic (among other major genres). In the 
third and last part, I will be inquiring about the meaning and the limits 
of the epic. 
 
2 Paul Ricoeur,“The Image of God and the Epic of Man” in History and Truth, trans. Charles 
Kelbley. (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1965), 112.  
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I would immediately have to mention that I encounter two 
objections: the first, without doubt the more serious, is that the epic, 
as a grand narrative—I would even say as the narrative of all 
narratives, insofar as a totalizing narrative—represents without doubt 
the most dangerous one the twentieth century has seen. One could 
even make the connection between Paul Ricoeur’s theology of 
recapitulation and Hegelian thought. We find it quite surprising to 
read a text so Hegelian, at a time when Ricoeur sought above all to 
think tragedy and evil; but perhaps it should not so much be 
surprising since several genres are necessary in order to approach such 
a theme. 
As for the second objection, it is that “epic Christianity” is a 
contradiction in terms! We have there two kinds of ethics that are 
antagonistic to each other: Christianity advocates the love of enemies, 
humility, forgiveness, not taking heed of oneself. The epic, in contrast, 
recounts wrath, courage, the trials of the self. It was precisely 
Chateaubriand who had the idea, which certainly seemed to him 
urgent and indispensable to his time, of attempting to formulate an 
epic Christianity, one which would gather the two fragments of our 
civilization. One single author had been able, so he thought, to find 
this epic tone: John Milton in his Paradise Lost, an epic of human 
freedom, of which, it could rightly be said, Ricoeur gives a summary 
at the end of his text: “Perhaps it is necessary to believe that God 





3 Ibid., 149. 





Some points for context: In 1960 Ricoeur left Strasbourg to join 
the faculty of the Sorbonne. On a voluntary basis, he gives courses at 
the Protestant Faculty at boulevard Arago, he heads the Protestant 
Federation of Teaching; in short, he showed himself to be attached to 
this old French protestantism, which was committed to the ideals of 
freedom, the Enlightenment, the Republic, secularism, modernity. In 
1960, he did not yet “understand” that he was, in the minds of French 
intellectuals, stuck in the same bag not only with left-leaning 
Catholicism, but with a Pétainist brand of Catholicism. 
“The Image of God and the Epic of Man,” an article coming from 
a conference of the Christianisme social movement (to which somebody 
like Michel Rocard also belonged), of which Ricoeur had just been 
elected president, and was dedicated to his eldest son and daughter-in-
law, is, in several respects, a programmatic text. It is the third of a 
series of three texts. 
The first, which appeared in the same journal in 1958, is entitled 
“The Christian and the Meaning of History” and proposes a tripartite 
structure (the level of progress, the level of ambiguity, the level of 
hope) which we will find, differently formulated, in the twofold 
structure of our text. What is most important in this text is the refusal 
of the opposition, quite pronounced in Jacques Ellul4, between the  
progress of modernity and Christian eschatology. There is an 
accumulation of knowledges, works, experiences, techniques: “We 
had to begin, therefore, by presenting a rather broad view of history 
as the accumulation of traces and the deposit of human works 
 
4 Another influential intellectual of the Reformed Church of France, famous for his critique 
of the “technological bluff”. 




detached from their authors, something analogous to liquid assets.”5 
Now this epic idea, that 
the whole of humanity—I am reminded of this beautiful 
expression from Pascal—is like a single man who 
unceasingly learns and remembers, no longer touches 
anyone . . . The early Greek Fathers . . . sensed it 
collectively, a sort of mystical body which would be the 
image of Christ. This kind of wholesale divinisation, 
which in many ways is found in the thought of Teilhard  
de Chardin, this planetary epic of men appears 
completely fragmented in the particular and even 
individual projects for well-being.6 
In “The Christian and the Meaning of History,” however, Ricoeur 
is more Kantian in his approach to the level of hope: there is to be 
sure a meaning, but it is hidden, it remains to be imagined and to be 
interpreted. Ricoeur writes thus: “a civilization does not advance en 
masse nor does it stagnate in every respect. It has several schemata. . . . 
The tide does not rise at the same time on all the shores of a nation’s 
life.”7 And this is why he will be able, at the end of this text, to put 
forward the position that 
In order to guard against fanaticism, it is helpful not only 
to multiply explanatory outlooks, but also to maintain, 
from a practical point of view, the sense of the 
discontinuity of problems . . . but on the contrary, are we  
 
 
5 Ibid., 84. Moreover, Ricœur speaks of  “this epic of human works without man.”, ibid., 85 
6  « Sens et fonction d’une communauté ecclésiale » (“The Meaning and Function of an 
Ecclessial Community”), 23–24, unpublished photocopy from 1967, Fonds Ricœur. 
7  “Christianity and the Meaning of History,” in History and Truth, trans. Charles Kelbley. 
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1965), 88. 




not forced to say that things are much more complicated 
and confused? The Manichaeism in history is foolish and 
wicked.8 
The second of these texts is entitled “The Socius and the 
Neighbor” and dates from 1954. It sets forth a pragmatic reversal of 
the theme of the neighbor, understood, according to the “Calvinist” 
reading of the Parable of the good Samaritan, not as a sociological 
category but as a practice: “to make oneself a neighbor to. . . .” This 
reversal makes it possible to place the immediate relations (individual) 
and the mediated relations (institutionalized) in a broader dialectic 
which blurs their opposition. The social bond is never so close and 
deep, never so immense and universal; and the love of the neighbor, 
recast unceasingly through the incognito character of the face of Christ 
(“When were you hungry and we gave you food?”), never ceases to 
make our relations operate in both directions. Sometimes charity 
passes through the anonymous institutions of public offices, 
sometimes it criticizes them, and demands of the rules of justice to 
better integrate care. 
We could intersperse here a number of other texts, which 
appeared in the journal Christianisme social and which were not 
reprinted in History and Truth, but which bear no less witness to this 
epic strand. I think notably of “The Technological Adventure and 
its Global Horizon” (1958), “Adventures of the State and the Task 
of Christians” (1958), and “From Nation to Humanity: Task of 
Christians” (1965).9 
 
8 Ibid., 96. 
9 These three texts have reappeared during their author’s lifetime in Autres Temps, nº 76–77, 
entitled “Paul Ricœur. Histoire et civilisation. Neuf textes jalons pour un Christianisme social” 
[Paul Ricœur. History and Civilization. Nine Landmark Texts toward a Social Christianity], 2003. 
Translator’s note: The last two texts have appeared in English in the collection Political and 
Social Essays, ed. David Stewart and Joseph Bien (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1974), 201–
16 and 134–59 respectively. 




The third of the texts retained in the section “Theological 
Perspectives” of History and Truth, that which interests us here, “The 
Image of God and the Epic of Man,” articulates from the very start 
its ethical agenda: it is an issue of making space for the breadth and 
depth of evil, downfall, the irrational, the absurd, but also for the 
breadth and depth of the good, salvation, grace, the rational, 
meaning. 10  I would like to add here that the context of its  
publication in Revue du christianisme social shows how much this article 
targets a certain individualist protestantism where sin is reduced to 
moral guilt, and where grace is reduced to the “recruitment of the 
lone chosen ones,” at the expense of the more communal, political, 
and even cosmic dimensions of ruin and redemption. 
Ricoeur is going to explore this across the registers of the three 
passions described by Kant in his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of 
View: the passions of having, power, and worth. In each of these 
registers, we have the paradox that the advances of rationality are 
also the advances of irrationality, and that we must think them 
together. It is therefore necessary for us to get out of a purely moral, 
in the narrow sense, conception of evil, but as well of a purely 
theological, spiritual, or rather pious one of salvation. If there is 
forcefulness in Marx, Machiavelli, and Hegel thinking the economy, 
politics, and culture, it is because they are not moralizing. 
Looking carefully at the table of contents, one can say that the 
text sets the program of an important section of the second part of 
History and Truth, that which concerns the question of power. 
But this text is also programmatic for the whole of his 




 Paul Ricoeur,“Guilt, Ethics, and Religion” in The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in 
Hermeneutics, ed. Don Ihde (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 439. Ricœur will 
propose to “incorporate evil into the epic of hope.” 




of duration, an ontology of originary affirmation capable of 
understanding and including (comprendre) negativity at work there. 
One also sees the importance of a whole new language—understood 
as the paradigm of what holds human beings together, of the 
communal and the individual, of work and the word, of structure 
and the event—affirmed there. The importance of the narrative and 
of history as plot is also noticeable there. 
Finally, one sees there the central role of imagination, of utopia, 
and of imaginative creativity. Imagination here heeds the command 
of existence. I will retain three things from this poetic, prophetic, 
and prospective function of the imagination. First, one can relate 
this with what Ricoeur calls elsewhere the “ethical-mythical nucleus” 
of cultures: it is the idea that there is always already an imaginary 
core, with images of the good life, with visions of the world, and 
that only a poetic intervention can agitate and disrupt the orientation 
of this imaginary. In the second place, one sees that the imaginary 
here is the element of recognition (the image of the self and the 
image of the other), and that this mutual recognition is borne by the 
mediations through which this imaginary is instituted (this word 
institution comes up again and again all throughout the text, and 
Ricoeur even says the real meaning of the institution touches this 
imaginary institution and that it is open to a psychoanalysis of the 
imagination11). There is, therefore, besides domination by force or 
economic profit, a specifically cultural alienation of the human 
image, which affects and mystifies all the way to the recesses of our 
relations. And there is, besides the political institutions (which set 
the bounds for the relations of power) and the economic institutions  
 
 
11 One thinks, of course, of Cornelius Castoriadis, but in 1960, Ricœur is at the Sorbonne, 
then a colleague of Bachelard, and one can also liken the development of Ricœur to that of 
Bachelard. But the institutional dimension is obviously lacking in Bachelard. 




(which set the bounds for the relations of profit), a place for the 
“traditions of the imaginary” that institute the possibility of mutual 
recognition. The third thesis which I will retain in the text of 
Ricoeur, with regard to the imagination, concerns the “utopic 
function of culture.” This function is borne here by the figure of the 
scandal and the untimely artist.12 
But what is more epic in this text seems to me to be a matter of 
style. When Ricoeur writes at the beginning of the text: 
I should like to begin, therefore, with the consideration 
of the most grandiose interpretation given to it by some 
of the Greek and Latin fathers . . . Let us think about the 
scope of the revolution in the history of thought that 
this text represents in relation to that Neo-Platonism 
and when, farther, he adds, “I am proceeding timidly on hazardous 
pathways, and I would ask you whether it is hope which calls us 
onward or the seductive influence of the world . . .”13, one recognizes 
the tone which belongs to the epistles of Paul, this combination of 
interiority, of expressiveness, of tensility.14 One could say that it is this 
tone which has disappeared with the years in Ricoeur, even if, at 
bottom, I believe that this ancient epic core has always been there, up 
to the very end—which is also what it means for the moral norm to 




12  Who doesn’t know whether one is destroying or building, whether one is master of 
truthfulness or of seduction, and that is why the restlessness of “false consciousness”—
incongruous, delayed/dislodged—is insurmountable. 
13 “The Image of God and the Epic of Man,” in History and Truth, 110–111, 126.  
14 In any case, it is understandable that someone who explains himself this way is not a 
product of the École normale supérieure and could not be admitted to the Collège de France! 




The Epic Subject 
What then is the subject of the epic? What is this subject capable 
of the epic, capable of reading and heeding the epic, but also capable 
of acting and working in an epic way? We are crossing here from the 
theological to the anthropological, and recall that 1960 marks precisely 
the appearance of Fallible Man, of which it cannot be said enough that 
it was for Ricoeur himself one of his favorite books, one of those 
which in his regard was the most accomplished. What I will be testing 
here is the possibility of bridging the epic and fragility, and to see in 
fragility the heart of an epic anthropology, that is to say of an 
anthropology capable of thinking the possibility of evil but capable as 
well of thinking the possibility of salvation—the idea would even be 
that only a theological anthropology, an anthropology exploring the 
share of inhumanity in the human and of humanity in the inhuman, to 
be in a position to think the capacity for radical evil and the possibility 
of reopening the human heart to absolute goodness. This lies in the 
discrepancy between the finite and the infinite, obviously coming 
from Descartes, but reinterpreted and radicalized by Kierkegaard: it is 
not only cognitive error which is the effect of this finite/infinite 
discrepancy, it is also ethical fault, and finally skeptical disgust. And as 
Ricoeur writes, “The ‘heart,’ the restless heart would be the fragile 
moment par excellence. All the disproportions . . . would be interiorized 
in the heart.”15 
The heart, the thumos, is really the seat of epic courage, but, 
precisely, it is quite important for courage not to be dissociated from 
fragility. Whence the importance of what one could call the odyssey 
of feeling, which is a matter of the heart: 
 
15 Paul Ricoeur, Fallible Man, trans. Charles A. Kelbley (New York: Fordham University Press, 
1986), 82. 




Feeling can be described only paradoxically as the unity 
of an intention and an affection, of an intention toward 
the world and an affection of the self. This paradox, 
however, is only the sign pointing toward the mystery 
of feeling, namely, the undivided connection of my 
existence with beings and being through desire and 
love. . . . The infinitude of feeling emerges clearly from 
the fact that no organized, historical community, no 
economy, no politic, no human culture can exhaust  
this demand for a totalization of persons, of a 
Kingdom in which, nevertheless, we now are and “in 
which, alone, we are capable of continuing our 
existence.”16 
This is why the epic subject remains to the very end conflict, 
tension, “. . . this disproportion of βίος and λόγος, of living and 
thinking, of which our ‘heart’ suffers the primordial discord.”17 
Then, the epic subject is a we, a subject indivisibly communal and 
singular, a plural subject. This is so first of all because it sets the stage 
for human action, in Hannah Arendt’s sense, which makes space for 
the plurality of actors. Epic timing is that where each of the characters 
enters the scene one by one and shows what they are capable of 
before finding themselves in the midst of others, in the chorus of 
spectators who authorize the newcomers by way of their approval or 
their complaints. 
This plural subject is also a narrative subject, a subject who is 
narrated and who narrates. But it is not only the plurality of characters 
which counts here, it is the plurality of narrative points of view which  
 
 
16 Ibid., 89 and 103. Ricœur takes up here a Kantian formula. 
17 Ibid., 132. 




assures that the plot is always plural and that the narrative is always 
shattered, broken. In the same way, then, that courage remains fragile, 
the epic narrative remains plural. At the same time, epic narration 
condenses, contracts time, and intensifies its conflictual nature. There 
remains therefore something unconsummated in the narrative. 
Moreover, the importance of the narrative in Ricoeur should not be 
overemphasized, as in certain readings of Time and Narrative: the 
narrative remains one genre among others, as one sees it in Thinking 
Biblically, and if there are particularly epic passages in the book of  
Exodus, in the crossing of the Sinai, in the history of a people making 
their way through the night, scattered and yet unbeknownst to 
themselves, there are others depending on completely different 
genres, that of everyday wisdom, or that of interpretation of the law, 
or that of prophetic imminence—in the same way that for Hegel the 
epic is, together with tragedy and comedy, an ancient genre among 
others. 
Finally, the epic subject is bound to the anthropology of grand 
scales. One can speak of an epic when one is capable of magnifying, 
broadening the point of view, of expanding, of widening. One speaks 
of an epic when one takes our stories from the point of their general 
interest and not from their particular aspects, when our lesser stories 
(petites histoires) are set in a broader history (histoire plus vaste). One 
speaks of an epic when there is importance: each word, each singular 
gesture, then, can touch and attain totality. To act becomes at each 
moment metaphorical, that is to say, it is what it does in the present,  
but also what it shows and which is, however, absent. To act 
somehow signifies that the world is not yet accomplished. This feeling 
of “kingdomly” importance of words and deeds, has for its basis an 
epic anthropology of recapitulation. But the Kingdom is also Exile, 
the feeling of the fleeting in the chance setting which is our unfinished  
 




world. And when it comes to what is important, we don’t always 
know where to find it. An insignificant thing can turn out to be quite 
important, and the enormity of something imposing itself on 
everything can end up being nothing but a bluff. It is the theme of the 
incognito that we encountered a while back: “It seems to me that the 
eschatological Judgment means that we ‘shall be judged’ on what we 
have done to persons, even without knowing it…. For we do not 
know when we influence persons.”18 What is important, therefore, is 
there, but we don’t always know where, it remains to be imagined. 
Meaning and Limits of the Epic 
The great epic rhythm is ternary, in the sense that it narrates a 
descent and an ascent, a negativity and a recovery. As with Hegel, the 
narrative trajectory contributes to history as a whole the morphology 
of the grand narrative, with its narrative functions, its turning points, 
the variations of its profiles, these ordeals, and this drama of 
recognition of which characters like Ulysses and Joseph are the 
heroes. We find ourselves in an extensive and extended time, in the 
sway of great durations. We are here in the most classic theology of 
salvation: creation, fall, redemption. To the horrifying breadth of evil 
responds the epic scale of redemption. 
Before getting to the danger that this vision might contain, it is 
worth taking time on the agenda of this Hegelian theodicy: Hegel is  
an anti-gnostic; for him, the world is not bad, it is not condemned to 
be thrown and to disappear. The rational is at work in the world, the 
world is intelligible and history has meaning. I would even be willing 
to say that what interests Hegel is not what overcomes, but what gives  
 
 
18 Paul Ricoeur,“The Socius and the Neighbor,” in History and Truth, translated by Charles 
Kelbley (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1965), 109. 




meaning to what is overcome, replaced, and taken up—it is here  
where one finds his “Christic” interpretation of life and history, along 
the same lines of the mystics of the Rhine. However, this grand 
narrative is very dangerous. On one hand, Hegel obviously serves as 
the template for the great nationalist narratives which rose to power 
up to the Great War. One looks to him again for a template, hardly 
secularized, for the great narrative of colonial and “liberator”. And it 
is still he who pursues the discourse of progress and development 
which, for better or for worse, manages the world today. 
Philosophically, and on the other hand, we have long been 
detached from this: we don’t believe that there would be a master plot 
or a narrative so powerful as to integrate everything, to explain 
everything, to justify everything. We no longer believe in a language 
that would claim to say everything. In short, as Ricoeur declared in 
the third volume of Time and Narrative, it was necessary for us to 
“renounce Hegel” and to accept that narrative identity encounters its 
limit in encountering the non-narrative elements of identity: “the 
notion of narrative identity encounters its limit and has to link up with 
the non-narrative components in the formation of an acting 
subject.”19 
And yet Ricoeur in a way already says all of this in our text. 
Precisely, the diverse downfalls of having, power, and worth do not 
form a system: there is no ruin of ruins, no ruin absolutely radical. In  
the same way, there is no eminent redemption which could sum up 
everything: the plurality of the spheres of human existence is 
insurmountable. Working during the same time on Kant, we see in 
 
19 Paul Ricœur, Time and Narrative. Volume 3. Narrated Time, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David 
Pellauer (Chicago: The Chicago University Press, 1988), 249. The section entitled “Should We 
Renounce Hegel?” is found on pp. 193–206. 




the margins of Ricoeur’s copy of the Critique of Pure Reason this  
handwritten annotation: “to limit is to commit.”20 He will write soon: 
True evil, the evil of evil, is not the violation of an 
interdict, the subversion of the law, disobedience, but 
fraudulency in the work of totalization. . . . if the evil of  
evil is born on the way of totalization, it would appear 
only in a pathology of hope, as the inherent perversion 
in the problematic of fulfillment and of totalization. To 
put it in a few words, the true malice of man appears 
only in the state and in the church, as institutions of 
gathering together, of recapitulation, of totalization.21 
For all these reasons, it seems to me that the epic proposed in 
“The Image of God and Epic of Man” is a broken epic, an 
archipelagic epic, an epic permanently in the state of desire. I would 
willingly say an epic de-totalized, in the sense of Moses dying without 
reaching the promised land.  Or, to use another image, I will speak of 
a labyrinthine epic, of which none can have a synoptic point of view.  
If there remains an epic word to retain, a word which comes up again 
and again from the pen of Ricoeur, it is the word “amongst”. 
Concluding Remarks 
What would happen if the epic, the epic genre, were to be 
eliminated? We could moreover ask the question with regard to all  
major genres: comedy, law, prophecy, hymn, wisdom. The epic would 
 
20  Translator’s note: “limiter, c’est militer”. There is a word play here that is impossible to 
capture in English. Suffice it to say that, apart from the anagram, “militer” in French does not have 
the exclusively negative connotation (acting against) that it has in English. Indeed, one could even 
say that here it has the positive connotations of engaging in, committing to, campaigning for . . .. 
On p. 2, the author of the paper uses the same verb in reference to Ricœur’s particular brand of 
Protestantism. 
21 Paul Ricoeur, “Freedom in the Light of Hope”, in The Conflict of Interpretations, ed. Don Ihde. 
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 423. 




probably make a fierce comeback through the window (from behind, 
par la fenêtre), in wild and dangerous forms. In any case, the epic 
subject which we sought to describe would disappear with it:  
the subject of fragile courage, the subject of plural narration, the 
subject of anonymous importance. Moreover, only an epic discourse 
can bear and support for long a critical discourse, which would have 
the critical scope necessary for our time. 
Hegel believed that each people has its own epic, its own bible, its 
founding book. As for Ricoeur, he evokes in “Universal Civilization 
and National Cultures” the ethical-mythical nucleus of each 
civilization.22 It seems to me that the epic points to this nucleus, that is 
to say to this language in an inchoate state, in a state of fusion before 
the separation of the spheres of language and human activities.23 As he 
wrote in the third volume of Time and Narrative: 
By fusing in this way with history, fiction carries history 
back to their common origin in the epic. More precisely, 
what the epic did in the sphere of the admirable, the 
story of the victims does in the sphere of the horrible.  
This almost negative epic preserves the memory of the  
suffering, on the scale of peoples, as epics and history in 
their beginnings transformed the ephemeral glory of 
heroes into lasting fame.24 
If the epic has something to do with the admirable, it is because 
friendship understood in an epic sense pushes each of us in turn to 
give our best, to give without counting the cost, go beyond oneself in  
 
 
22  Paul Ricoeur,“Universal Civilization and National Cultures,” in History and Truth, trans. 
Charles Kelbley (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1965), 280. 
23 In that sense, it can be said that the epic has a lot to do with “theology”, with what seeks to 
name this core. 
24 Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 3: Narrated Time, 188–89. 




excellence. We are here at the heart of age-old morality. But contrary 
to the objection raised at the start, the spirit of Christianity is not 
opposed to the spirit of the epic; according to Simone Weil, it is the 
ultimate flowering of it: “The Gospels are the last marvelous 
expression of the Greek genius, as the Iliad is the first . . . .”25 In fact, 
the epic spirit is the capacity to love one’s enemies, that is to say the  
minimal capacity of understanding through which we put ourselves in 
the place of our enemies’ friends, but also the capacity to withdraw 
oneself from the reign of force in order to regard one’s enemy 
humanely, with goodness, as in the scene where Achilles lifts Priam 
begging him for Hector’s body. Ricoeur, in his final years, read this 
text much; indeed, it is in his name that I propose to meditate on this 
last sentence of Simone Weil: “Perhaps they will yet rediscover the 
epic genius, when they learn that there is no refuge from fate, learn 
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25 Simone Weil, “The Iliad, or the Poem of Force,” Chicago Review 18, no. 2 (1965): 27. 
26 Ibid., 30. 
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